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CHEAP SENTIMENT 
CLAIRE A. HILL∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider a person who bemoans the lack of organs available for 
transplantation but strongly disapproves of any sort of compensation or other 
financial inducement being paid for organs.1 Consider also a person who strongly 
disapproves of the use of “cheap” labor but who buys products made using it.2 
Finally, consider a person who objects to surge pricing by alternative 
transportation services such as Uber, including in non-emergency situations, and 
then bemoans the difficulty of getting places in bad weather or during peak 
weekend or holiday times.3 These are all examples of what I call “cheap 
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 1. The survey evidence on people’s views about organ donation and sale and blood donation and 
sale is voluminous. Among the topics studied are attitudes towards payment for organs and blood, 
differences based on people’s age, race, or experiences with those giving or receiving organs or blood, 
whether people would donate (sell?) more if they had financial incentives, whether payment leads to 
lower-quality organs and blood being obtained (as per a debate begun in seminal work by Richard 
Titmuss, see RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP (Ann Oakley & John Ashton eds., 1997)), 
and whether valuable incentives other than cash payments might be effective. Regarding public attitudes 
concerning organ donation and transplantation and related financial incentives, see, e.g., Klaus Hoeyer 
et al., Public Attitudes to Financial Incentive Models for Organs: A Literature Review Suggests that it is 
Time to Shift the Focus from “Financial Incentives” to “Reciprocity,” 26 TRANSPLANT INT’L 350 (2013); 
TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, EUROBAROMETER 72.3: ORGAN DONATION AND 
TRANSPLANTATION (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_333a 
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY97-QZ7B]; U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIVISION OF 
TRANSPLANTATION, 2012 NATIONAL SURVEY OF ORGAN DONATION ATTITUDES AND 
BEHAVIORS (2013), https://www.organdonor.gov/dtcp/nationalsurveyorgandonation.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/E5WA-UTNV]. Regarding blood donation, see, e.g., Joan Costa-Font et al., Not all Incentives Wash 
out the Warm Glow: The Case of Blood Donation Revisited (Ctr. for Econ. Performance, Discussion 
Paper No. 1157, 2012), http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp1157.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 89VT-B7W4]; 
TNS OPINION & SOCIAL, EUROBAROMETER 72.3: BLOOD DONATION AND BLOOD 
TRANSFUSIONS (2010), http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/archives/ebs/ebs_333b_en. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/GW7L-UXEB]. 
 2. See, e.g., Gethin Chamberlain, Admit It. You Love Cheap Clothes. And You Don’t Care About 
Child Slave Labour, THE GUARDIAN (July 27, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/28/ 
india-sweated-labour [https://perma.cc/5LWN-8LL3]. 
 3. See, e.g., Neil Irwin, Why Surge Prices Make Us So Mad: What Springsteen, Home Depot, and a 
Nobel Winner Know, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/14/upshot/why-
surge-prices-make-us-so-mad-what-springsteen-home-depot-and-a-nobel-winner-know.html?_r=0 
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sentiment”—having a belief that is in some sense self-serving, perhaps even 
priding oneself on that belief, but not acknowledging or accepting the 
consequences of policy based on the belief.4 
What individuals believe and do is beyond the scope of this paper, but one 
result of individual belief and action—that it can strongly affect policy—is not. 
Cheap sentiment is importantly a social pathology: people look to their 
communities to validate their beliefs of what is moral and what they are entitled 
to. Policymakers may themselves have cheap sentiment, or they may just 
formulate their policies in response to constituents and members of the society 
who do. 
This article argues that cheap sentiment can be an impediment to sound 
policymaking in many different spheres. Cheap sentiment can lead market 
approaches and solutions to be dismissed notwithstanding significant costs of 
doing so. This is not to say that market approaches and solutions should always 
be chosen. For instance, policymakers would presumably appropriately reject a 
plan to pay a country whose citizens have bad health, short lives, and very little 
money a great deal of money to accept a pollutant-emitting factory.5 But market 
approaches and solutions should not be rejected for reasons that do not 
acknowledge or properly take into account the costs of doing so.6 
 
[https://perma.cc/GU5Q-PUTE]; Tim Sullivan, What Economists Don’t Get about Uber’s Surge Pricing, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 17, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/12/what-economists-dont-get-about-ubers-surge-
pricing [https://perma.cc/2A3U-WP9U].  
 4. The intuition at its extreme is well-captured in the lyrics from the Tom Lehrer song, “Wernher 
von Braun”: “‘Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down? That’s not my department!’ 
Says Wernher von Braun.” TOM LEHRER, Wernher von Braun, on THAT WAS THE YEAR THAT WAS 
(Reprise/Warner Bros. Records 1965). The song is based on the life of Wernher von Braun, a German 
scientist who developed rockets for the Germans in the Second World War, came to the U.S. after World 
War II, and eventually began building missiles for the U.S. Army. Biography of Wernher von Braun, 
MARSHALL HISTORY, https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/history/vonbraun/bio.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZH68-Z3ME] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).  
 5. Consider, in this regard, the furor over Lawrence Summer’s letter, which he described as satire, 
arguing that pollution-spewing factories should be located in low-income countries. Furor on Memo at 
World Bank, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/07/business/furor-on-memo-at-
world-bank.html [https://perma.cc/LW9X-GED7] (“‘A given amount of health-impairing pollution 
should be done in the country with the lowest cost, which will be the country with the lowest wages,’ said 
the memo, which was obtained from a critic of the World Bank’s environmental record. ‘I think the 
economic logic behind dumping a load of toxic waste in the lowest-wage country is impeccable and we 
should face up to that.’”). See also Toxic Memo, HARV. MAG. (May 1, 2001), 
https://harvardmagazine.com/2001/05/toxic-memo.html [https://perma.cc/QFF3-WB7Q]. The furor over 
the memo is considered to have adversely affected Summers’ ability to get a top job in government. A. 
Siegel, Larry Summers to Bring a Foul Smell to World Bank?, DAILY KOS (Jan. 20, 2012), 
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2012/1/20/1056789/- [https://perma.cc/ZH9U-W3MT]. 
 6. Cheap sentiment also can lead to undue faith in market approaches and solutions, an intuition 
aptly captured by the famous economists’ joke in which a senior economist and a junior economist are 
walking down the street, the junior economist alerts the senior economist to a $20 bill on the floor, and 
the senior economist refuses to stoop down, on grounds that if the bill had been on the floor, someone 
else would have picked it up. Such a view might be used to justify not outlawing racial discrimination in 
employment on grounds that employers would surely hire the most productive workers, especially if they 
could get some of them more cheaply, and that this effect would soon eliminate discrimination, since the 
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There is of course an enormous amount of scholarship on what people 
believe, why they believe it, and how to change people’s beliefs.7 The focus of this 
article is most similar to that of the literature addressing inconsistencies between 
a person’s beliefs or between a person’s beliefs and their actions.8 As discussed 
in Part I, the labels used to describe these inconsistencies are hypocrisy and 
cognitive dissonance. But this article also coins a new term, cheap sentiment. 
Cheap sentiment involves a particular inconsistency, one which is societal rather 
than personal: having a belief while being unwilling to acknowledge or bear 
(one’s share of) the belief’s broader societal consequences. The literature 
mentioned above focuses on what could be called traditional morality, 
paradigmatically hypocrisy. By contrast, cheap sentiment includes people’s 
senses of entitlement to a particular status quo, something that does not implicate 
traditional morality. 
This article frames the phenomenon of cheap sentiment in terms that should 
resonate in psychology, as a pathology applicable not just in contexts traditionally 
thought to be charged, and in economics, as a cost that should be taken into 
account, and that could potentially be reduced by due consideration of the 
consequences of the policies that instantiate it. This framing is intended to cast 
light on the costs cheap sentiment imposes, and serve as a needed counterweight 
to its undue force. 
I 
WHAT IS CHEAP SENTIMENT? 
A. Cheap Sentiment Compared With Cognitive Dissonance and Hypocrisy 
Cheap sentiment is related to cognitive dissonance, a concept originally from 
psychology, but used in other disciplines as well, including, notably for purposes 
 
‘$20 wouldn’t stay on the floor’ for long. See generally Kevin M. Murphy, How Gary Becker Saw the 
Scourge of Discrimination, CHI. BOOTH REV. (June 15, 2015), 
http://review.chicagobooth.edu/magazine/winter-2014/how-gary-becker-saw-the-scourge-of-
discrimination [https://perma.cc/79WK-FHYC] (discussing Becker’s view that market forces would not 
eliminate discrimination). 
 7. For works that discuss trying to change people’s behavior, see, e.g., FINDING SOLUTIONS TO 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS: BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE (Mark A. Mattaini & Bruce A. Thyer 
eds., 1996); RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2009); Nicola J. Roberts et al., Behavioral Interventions Associated 
with Smoking Cessation in the Treatment of Tobacco Use, 6 HEALTH SERV. INSIGHTS 79 (2013); Robert 
A. C. Ruiter et al., Applying Social Psychology to Understanding Social Problems, in SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS: THE INTERGROUP CONTEXT (Agnieszka Golec de Zavala 
& Aleksandra Cichocka eds., 2012). 
 8. See, e.g., Matthew Rabin, Cognitive Dissonance and Social Change, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
177 (1994). See also Mitesh Kataria & Tobias Regner, Honestly, Why Are You Donating Money to 
Charity? An Experimental Study about Self-Awareness in Status-Seeking Behavior, 79 THEORY & 
DECISION 493 (2015) (presenting results of an experiment in which people demonstrated their lack of 
self-awareness of their status-seeking behavior). 
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of this essay, economics.9 The concept was introduced by Leon Festinger in 1957; 
its seminal exposition is in a book called When Prophecy Fails: Fails: A Social and 
Psychological Study of a Modern Group That Predicted the Destruction of the 
World.10 The book explores how members of a group adjusted when the world 
did not end the day their group had predicted it would: rather than concluding 
that they had been mistaken, they doubled down on the belief, making further 
predictions for the date of the end of the world and increasing their 
proselytizing.11 
A recent paper defines cognitive dissonance as “the idea that people find 
having inconsistent beliefs or making inconsistent choices to be uncomfortable, 
and take action to avoid this inconsistency or ‘dissonance.’”12 Another paper 
defines cognitive dissonance as “the desire of an individual to perceive himself or 
herself as a moral person,” such that the “individual is motivated to reduce 
dissonance to alleviate this threat to self-concept and self-integrity.”13 
The resolutions people use to resolve discomfort can involve changing actions 
or beliefs, or rationalization, trying to account for the inconsistency; alternatively, 
people may be able to ignore the dissonance.14 
Cheap sentiment also involves inconsistent beliefs or actions, but the beliefs 
or actions may or may not cause psychological discomfort. If they do not, there 
is no reason to suppose that they would cause changes to actions or beliefs. 
People may ignore the inconsistency, continuing to hold the inconsistent beliefs 
or acting contrary to their beliefs. Alternatively, especially if called to explain or 
 
 9. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 8. 
 10. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 2–4 (1957); LEON FESTINGER ET 
AL., WHEN PROPHECY FAILS: A SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDY OF A MODERN GROUP THAT 
PREDICTED THE DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD (1957) [hereinafter PROPHECY]. See also Leon 
Festinger & James M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequences of Forced Compliance, 58 J. ABNORMAL & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959); Leon Festinger, Cognitive Dissonance, 207 SCI. AM. 93 (1962) [hereinafter 
Cognitive Dissonance] for further discussions of cognitive dissonance. More recent work includes Frenk 
van Harreveld et al., The ABC of Ambivalence: Affective, Behavioral and Cognitive Consequences of 
Attitudinal Conflict, 52 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 285 (2015) (discussing the concept 
of ambivalence as distinct from cognitive dissonance: “an important difference between [ambivalence 
and dissonance] lies in the fact that dissonance is usually the result of a behavioral commitment that is in 
conflict with a preexisting attitude. Ambivalence is also defined by conflict, but within one’s attitude and 
often not related to any behavioral commitment.”).  
 11. PROPHECY, supra note 10, at 213–15. 
 12. Daniel F. Stone & Daniel H. Wood, Cognitive Dissonance, Motivated Reasoning, and 
Confirmation Bias: Applications in Industrial Organization, in HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION (Carol Tremblay et al. eds., forthcoming May 2018), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2834072 [https://perma.cc/Y2HJ-GAJB]. The term 
is sufficiently a part of everyday language that it appears in the Merriam Webster dictionary, which 
defines cognitive dissonance as “psychological conflict resulting from incongruous beliefs and attitudes 
held simultaneously.” Cognitive Dissonance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/cognitive%20dissonance [https://perma.cc/3PTA-K2SX] (last visited Dec. 18, 
2017). 
 13. Valerie Fointiat, “I Know What I Have to Do, But . . .”: When Hypocrisy Leads to Behavioral 
Change, 32 SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 741, 742 (2004).  
 14. See Cognitive Dissonance, supra note 10, at 93.  
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justify her view, a person might use rationalization.15 A person’s recourse to 
rationalization may or may not indicate that she experiences discomfort from the 
inconsistency. 
It may not be easy to determine whether an explanation is indeed a 
rationalization. For instance, a person who does not pay her taxes might state 
that she does not approve of what the government spends tax money on. This 
might, or might not, be a rationalization. Is the person who bemoans the lack of 
organs available for transplantation, but rejects changing rules against 
compensation for organs because people should be willing to donate organs, 
rationalizing? Maybe, but maybe not. There are many possible “expensive” 
rationales for such a belief. A person might believe that the consequences of the 
organ shortage are less problematic than the results of paying in some manner 
for organs—such as encouraging unscrupulous doctors, coercing poor people for 
whom the compensation will be too tempting, and other problems associated with 
commodification and monetizing body parts16—and be willing, for herself and 
others, to accept the consequences. We cannot know whether the person would 
continue holding the belief if she or a loved one needed an organ and none were 
available except via some sort of financial inducement. 
A presumably less controversial case of rationalization is when a person is 
rejected from a well-paying interesting job to which he applied or a prestigious 
university to which he sought admission and claims that “he didn’t want to 
work/go there anyway.”17 Even absent agreement that particular explanations are 
rationalizations, it seems uncontroversial to assert that people do sometimes 
rationalize, whether to themselves or others, to resolve inconsistencies in their 
beliefs or their beliefs and their actions. 
 
 
 15.  Neel Burton, Self-Deception I: Rationalization-Human Beings Are Not Rational, but 
Rationalizing Animals, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-
and-seek/201203/self-deception-i-rationalization [https://perma.cc/HW39-V7KS]; Rationalization, 
CHANGING MINDS, http://changingminds.org/explanations/behaviors/coping/rationalization.html 
[https://perma.cc/YAQ8-7SMG] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017).  
 16. See generally RENE ALMELING, SEX CELLS: THE MEDICAL MARKET FOR EGGS AND SPERM 
(2011) (discussing “what exactly happens when people are paid for parts of their bodies”); MICHELE 
GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS (2006) (critiquing present 
systems of organ procurement and allocation); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Lessons from Law About 
Incomplete Commodification in the Egg Market, 33 J. APPLIED PHIL. 160 (2016) (discussing difficulty of 
reconciling market realities with nonmarket ideals in the context of egg donation). In this regard, consider 
Titmuss’s argument that paying for blood might lead the blood supply to be of lower-quality; those 
motivated purely by the prospect of helping others might have higher quality blood than people 
motivated by the cash payout, such that the former would be discouraged, but the latter would be 
encouraged, to donate (sell) blood for money. See TITMUSS, supra note 1. However, empirical evidence 
on the point is mixed. See, e.g., Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Moral Nimby-ism? Understanding 
Societal Support for Monetary Compensation to Plasma Donors in Canada, 81 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 3, 2018, at 83; Claudia Niza et al., Incentivizing Blood Donation: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis 
to Test Titmuss’ Hypotheses, 32 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 941 (2013). 
 17. Burton, supra note 15; Rationalization, supra note 15. 
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Another related concept is hypocrisy,18 which has been described as a special 
case of cognitive dissonance.19 But hypocrisy, like cheap sentiment, does not 
necessarily cause psychological discomfort. A person might, for instance, be able 
to ignore the extent to which they are saying one thing and doing another. Indeed, 
the canonical examples of hypocrisy do not cause discomfort precisely for this 
reason; scholarship often focuses on how to get people to acknowledge their 
hypocrisy and conform their actions and beliefs.20 
People can have cognitive dissonance about all sorts of things they think 
about or do. Recall that in Festinger’s seminal example, the dissonance resulted 
from the need by people thinking the world would end a certain day to account 
for the fact that the world did not end that day.21 Cognitive dissonance is in an 
important respect individual. Hypocrisy, too, is importantly individual—the 
person says one thing and does another. People can have idiosyncratic beliefs 
that cause them discomfort, or conflict with one another, without it being a matter 
that relates to the broader society.22 
 
 18. The relevant literature for my purposes includes C. Daniel Batson et al., In a Very Different 
Voice: Unmasking Moral Hypocrisy, 72 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1335 (1997); C. Daniel 
Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy: Appearing Moral to Oneself Without Being So, 77 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 525 (1999) [hereinafter Moral Hypocrisy]; Cécile Sénémeaud et al., Being Hypocritical 
Disturbs Some People More than Others: How Individual Differences in Preference for Consistency 
Moderate the Behavioral Effects of the Induced-Hypocrisy Paradigm, 9 J. SOC. INFLUENCE 133 (2014). 
Yet another related concept is that of self-discrepancy, developed by Tory Higgins. See, e.g., E. Tory 
Higgins, Self-Discrepancy: A Theory Relating Self and Affect, 94 PSYCH. REV. 319 (1987). Self-
discrepancy theory provides evidence for the existence of different types of discomfort people experience 
from, roughly speaking, discrepancies between how they view themselves and how they feel they should, 
or ideally would, be. 
 19. Teaching Tip Sheet: Cognitive Dissonance, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/pi/aids/ 
resources/education/dissonance.aspx [https://perma.cc/C4FL-KWWL] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017) 
(“Hypocrisy is a special case of cognitive dissonance, produced when a person freely chooses to promote 
a behavior that they do not themselves practice.”).  
 20. See Batson et al., Moral Hypocrisy, supra note 18. See also Elliot Aronson et al., Overcoming 
Denial and Increasing the Intention to Use Condoms through the Induction of Hypocrisy, 81 AM. J. PUB. 
HEALTH 1636 (1991) (providing evidence that hypocrisy induction was effective at overcoming teen 
denial of AIDS danger); Fointiat, supra note 13; Jeff Stone & Nicholas C. Fernandez, To Practice What 
We Preach: The Use of Hypocrisy and Cognitive Dissonance to Motivate Behavior Change, 2 SOC. & 
PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 1024 (2008) (reviewing literature on hypocrisy motivating behavior 
change); Jeff Stone & Elizabeth Focella, Hypocrisy, Dissonance and the Self-Regulation Processes that 
Improve Health, 10 SELF & IDENTITY 295 (2011) (discussing how hypocrisy represents a powerful 
strategy for engaging the self-regulation processes that improve health). But see ROBERT KURZBAN, 
WHY EVERYONE (ELSE) IS A HYPOCRITE: EVOLUTION AND THE MODULAR MIND (2012) (arguing for 
an evolutionary explanation of hypocrisy, and even arguing that hypocrisy is a good thing).          
 21. PROPHECY, supra note 10. 
 22. That is not to say that cognitive dissonance and hypocrisy don’t often relate to broader societal 
concerns. A congressional representative who defended Ken Starr’s role investigating Bill Clinton 
notwithstanding Starr’s contributions to Republican Party candidates, critiquing what he described as a 
strategy by Clinton and allies to “demonize” Starr and others who got in their way, strongly criticized the 
bias of the Mueller team, noting that they had donated to Democrats. See Jeremy Stahl, This 
Congressman Wins the Prize for the Most Odious Attack on Bob Mueller, SLATE (Dec. 15, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/12/this-congressman-wins-the-prize-for-the-most-odious-
attack-on-bob-mueller.html [https://perma.cc/E9RN-23FW].  
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By contrast, this article uses the term cheap sentiment to refer to matters 
where the cheapness—the cost not being paid—is societal. The person gets the 
benefit of holding their belief, but the cost is external. If the person acts, or 
presses for action to be taken, in furtherance of the belief, the cost may even be 
externalized—society bears the cost. 
What kinds of benefits are people getting from their cheap sentiment? In 
what sense is the sentiment self-interested? In most cases, the belief is part of 
people’s “self-concept and self-integrity.”23 People have a stake in thinking of 
themselves in a certain way. The claim here is not that this is mistaken or 
dishonest or constitutes self-deception.24 Rather, it is that being able to think of 
themselves in that way constitutes a benefit. With the benefit comes a cost; again, 
cheap sentiment is about wanting the benefit while not being in principle willing 
to bear the cost. This mindset is of social concern insofar as cheap sentiment 
motivates policy. 
While the beliefs at issue relate to people’s self-concept and self-integrity, 
they are importantly social, relating to beliefs held or stated by others. An 
explanation or justification for an inconsistency will serve its purpose only if the 
relevant community accepts it as such. Norms develop as to what explanations 
and justifications pass muster. A perhaps fanciful example: when I was in my 
teens, most of my peers were anti-fur coat, but at the same time were willing to 
buy cheap used fur coats at vintage stores. Our explanation, when confronted, 
was that our purchase did not cause the animal to be killed—the animal had 
already been killed, for the person willing to pay full price for the coat. At a 
certain point, that explanation stopped being acceptable among my peers, and 
we stopped buying the coats. Returning for a moment to the surge pricing 
examples, the reaction of outrage, both in the emergency and non-emergency 
situations, clearly passes muster in some communities—if it did not, there would 
not be much of a push to change policy to outlaw or limit surge pricing. 
In his article on cognitive dissonance, economist Matt Rabin makes a related 
point. Rabin characterizes a phenomenon similar to cheap sentiment as cognitive 
dissonance: the situation in which a person thinks of herself as moral but does not 
behave as morality requires. He characterizes such a situation as involving 
dissonance—that is, discomfort.25 Rabin states that: 
 
 23. Fointiat, supra note 13, at 742. 
 24. The role of self-deception in hypocrisy is discussed in, e.g., Moral Hypocrisy, supra note 18. On 
self-deception and rationalization see, e.g., Robert Audi, Self-Deception, Rationalization, and Reasons 
for Acting, in PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-DECEPTION (Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg 
Rorty eds., 1988); William von Hippel & Robert Trivers, The Evolution and Psychology of Self-
Deception, 34 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 1 (2011); David H. Sanford, Self-Deception as Rationalization, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON SELF-DECEPTION (Brian P. McLaughlin & Amélie Oksenberg Rorty eds., 1988); 
Robert Trivers, The Elements of a Scientific Theory of Self-Deception, 907 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 114 
(2000).  
 25. In the context of cheap sentiment, I take no position as to what morality requires, nor do I take 
a position as to whether people experience discomfort.  
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[C]hanges in beliefs by some individuals towards the “true” morality are likely to 
increase the cost to other people of having beliefs far away from the “true” morality. 
People find it harder to convince themselves that an activity is ethical if nobody else 
believes it is ethical. If everybody else decides that torturing animals for fur is wrong, 
then it becomes harder for an individual to convince himself that there is nothing wrong 
with wearing fur. Conversely, if everybody ignores the suffering caused to the animals, 
then it becomes easier for each person to ignore the true nature of his actions. 
These social effects in belief-formation have an important implication: a greater distaste 
for cognitive dissonance may lead not to less of an immoral activity, but rather to more 
of it. While a greater distaste for cognitive dissonance has the direct effect of decreasing 
the level of immoral activities, an indirect effect works in the opposite direction. 
Stronger cognitive dissonance will cause each person to believe that such activities are 
more acceptable; this in turns leads others to believe that the activity is more acceptable 
. . . [T]his leads to more of the activity.26 
Cheap sentiment involves people who benefit from having certain beliefs 
that, if translated into policy, would result in others, and perhaps at some point, 
themselves, bearing costs—costs that they themselves are not bearing at the time. 
Cheap sentiment thus potentially runs afoul of John Rawls’s conception of 
justice, according to which law should be developed as though its developers were 
behind a veil of ignorance.27 In this conception, people do not know their class or 
status in society, their “fortune in distribution of natural assets and abilities,” 
their “intelligence and strength and the like”28 or many other things. From behind 
such a veil, they can “evaluate principles solely on the basis of general 
considerations.”29 
But people are of course not behind a veil of ignorance. They know, or they 
think they know, a great deal about their own attributes and circumstances. The 
paradigmatic case of cheap sentiment is one where the person can be assured of 
not bearing any consequent costs. In the 1991 movie Dances With Wolves, 
Lieutenant John Dunbar, a Union officer, “finds himself alone in Indian territory 
in the 1860s, and eventually ‘finds himself,’ in the 1960s sense of the term, when 
he adopts a Sioux identity and name, Dances With Wolves.”30 A review of the 
movie by Caryn James astutely noted that, “Viewers enjoy a rousing old 
adventure and still feel they can save the planet. By assuming the point of view 
of Dunbar, the good and prescient white man, ‘Dances With Wolves’ becomes an 
appealing hybrid, a western without guilt.”31 A (white) person watching the 
 
 26. Rabin, supra note 8, at 179. 
 27. JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 28. Id. at 137. 
 29. Id. at 136–37. Various aspects of Rawls’s theory have been criticized. For a prominent critique 
of Rawls’s theory see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982). See also 
C. Edwin Baker, Sandel on Rawls, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 895 (1985) (summarizing and critiquing Sandel’s 
critique of Rawls’s Theory of Justice). But my use of Rawls here is largely orthogonal to the arguments 
in question; I am using his theory simply to articulate, using a different vocabulary, one important respect 
in which cheap sentiment is objectionable. 
 30. Caryn James, Frugging with Wolves, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/ 
01/13/movies/film-view-frugging-with-wolves.html [https://perma.cc/77V6-KSGS]. 
 31. Id. 
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movie can feel a virtuous identification with the Indians, and imagine that had he 
existed at the time, he too would have fought the good fight, and espoused pro-
Indian laws and policies without having to do anything perilous, or really, 
anything at all.32 
The costs of cheap sentiment go beyond those mentioned above. Standard 
economic theory suggests that when people can obtain a benefit without paying 
the associated cost, they will do so more than they would if they were paying it. 
A company that does not have to clean up the pollution it creates can be expected 
to create more pollution than one that does have to clean it up. Similarly, if I can 
think of myself as being virtuous and other-regarding when I do not have to 
sacrifice to do so, why would I not do it? The waters may be muddied, such that 
the esteem and recognition from others that may in part motivate being other-
regarding may not be so readily forthcoming. Being other-regarding may become 
less rewarding, which may lead to less other-regardingness. 
B. Examples of Cheap Sentiment 
The following are examples of possible cheap sentiment. The person who 
rejects compensated organ donors may think of herself as being other-regarding, 
caring very much that there are not enough organs available for transplantation, 
but also as valuing altruism over (crass) commerce. The person who objects to 
the practice of paying very little for labor probably thinks of herself as other-
regarding as well, caring for others, particularly those less fortunate.  She might 
think herself to be morally superior to those who do not have this view and 
particularly, to those who arrange for products made with cheap labor to be 
produced and sold. She might tell herself and others that if the t-shirt company’s 
executive officers were only paid what they were worth, they could pay a fair 
price for labor and sell t-shirts cheaply, thus justifying her purchase.33 Benefits of 
cheap labor to countries going through a “t-shirt phase” and to laborers whose 
alternatives are worse are not acknowledged.34  
 
 32. Cheap sentiment is of course a small subset of what Rawls’s theory would criticize. A person 
certain she is poor wanting a 99% tax rate for rich people would probably not be making her decision 
behind a veil of ignorance—she wouldn’t want to pay 99% if she were rich—but there is no “cheap 
sentiment.” The policy desired by the poor person is simply self-serving.  
 33. See Chamberlain, supra note 2. Searches for “child labor” or “cheap labor” yield many articles 
with expressions of outrage. There are articles, too, about how many developing countries went through 
a “t-shirt phase.” Finally, and most pertinently to my thesis, there are articles about how the same people 
who are outraged seem to be buying the cheap t-shirts anyway. See also Elise van Nederveen Meerkerk 
et al., Covering the World: Some Conclusions to the Project, in THE ASHGATE COMPANION TO THE 
HISTORY OF TEXTILE WORKERS, 1650-2000, at 773 (Lex Heerma van Voss et al. eds., 2010) (discussing 
“race to the bottom” in global textile industry). 
 34. See R.A., Out of Harm’s Way: What Next for the World’s Poorest Workers?, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 22, 2013), https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2013/05/technology [https:// 
perma.cc/PW6A-QYV7]; Adam Davidson, Economic Recovery, Made in Bangladesh?, N.Y. TIMES (May 
14, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/19/magazine/economic-recovery-made-in-bangladesh.html 
[https://perma.cc/8WRV-WGRH]. A related example involves the “NIMBY,” “not in my back yard,” 
phenomenon. Someone thinking of herself as having a social conscience may think that there should be 
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Returning to the medical arena, an important context for cheap sentiment is 
the selection criteria for allocation of organs and other scarce resources. Familiar 
examples include the extent to which somebody’s own “responsibility” for the 
condition that caused her to need an organ or some medical care she cannot 
afford should accord her a lesser priority. That the person is “responsible” might 
yield an assessment that the prior conduct is apt to be repeated, making the 
expenditure less valuable for that person than for some other person. Other 
examples are individuals who require vast expenditures on their care,35 including 
those near the end of their lives. Some people find the prospect of making such 
an allocation paralyzing, not wishing to be the sort of person who would decide 
not to treat someone, notwithstanding that absent an express allocation, there is 
simply not enough money to treat everyone, and there will still be denials of 
care.36 The benefit to not making the decision is that the person does not have to 
 
a halfway house or other facility for people who have served their prison sentences, to help such people 
transition to post-prison life—but not in her back yard. See generally Peter D. Kinder, Not in My 
Backyard Phenomenon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Not-in-My-
Backyard-Phenomenon [https://perma.cc/6GY3-EU42] (last visited Dec. 18, 2017) (discussing historical 
origins of “Nimby” and its common usages). Rationalizations may be given for why some other locale 
would be more desirable. I recall such an example from my childhood: a liberal community objecting to 
low-income housing in their community. See David M. Herszenhorn, Neighborhood Report: Forest Hills; 
At the Forest Hills Co-op, a Reminder of Past Fury, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
1995/10/22/nyregion/neighborhood-report-forest-hills-forest-hills-op-reminder-past-fury.html 
[https://perma.cc/5A8M-AWHQ]. But one can imagine a principled, albeit societally unfortunate, 
perspective, which was in fact one of the things said at the time: that the people had clawed their way out 
of the Lower East Side, then a ghetto, but now the Lower East Side was coming to them—that they were 
being asked to take on “more than their share” of sacrifice for the society. Is this a rationalization? 
Reasonable people can differ on this point. School choice is another important context. See, e.g., Dianna 
Douglas, Are Private Schools Immoral?: A Conversation with Nikole Hannah-Jones about Race, 
Education, and Hypocrisy, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
education/archive/2017/12/progressives-are-undermining-public-schools/548084/ [https://perma.cc/ 
UX3V-VFAF] (“‘White communities want neighborhood schools if their neighborhood school is white,’ 
[Hannah-Jones] says. ‘If their neighborhood school is black, they want choice.’ Charter schools and 
magnet schools spring up in place of neighborhood schools, where white students can be in the 
majority.”). 
 35. An example is the Iowa patient whose cost to their insurer (which is reflected in premiums 
charged to other people) is $1 million a month, a cost expected to be payable as long as the (young) 
patient lives? Michael Hiltzik, This One Unbelievably Expensive Iowa Patient Makes the Case for Single-
Payer Healthcare, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-iowa-
20170424-story.html [https://perma.cc/88LW-4THZ]; Tony Leys, Iowa Teen’s $1 Million-per-Month 
Illness No Longer a Secret, USA TODAY (May 31, 2017), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-
now/2017/06/01/iowa-teens-1-million-per-month-illness-no-longer-secret/360919001/ 
[https://perma.cc/HJ2G-RZEL]. The story may, however, be a bit murkier than it was initially presented 
as being. See Jonathan Cohn, An Iowa Teenager Didn’t Wreck His State’s Health Care Market. Here’s 
Who Did: A Case Study in Obamacare Success and Failure, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 29, 2017), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/iowa-teenager-obamacare-scapegoat_us_59f4715de4b077d8dfc9 
dd70?ncid=APPLENEWS00001 [https://perma.cc/59M5-BK2H]. 
 36. The extensive literature on omission vs. commission is relevant here. In the famous trolley 
problem, people won’t take an action that would kill one person even though the result would be to save 
five others. For two popular accounts of the trolley problem, see Sarah Bakewell, Clang Went the Trolley: 
“Would You Kill the Fat Man?” and “The Trolley Problem,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/24/books/review/would-you-kill-the-fat-man-and-the-trolley-problem. 
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think of herself as the sort of person who decides against giving someone an organ 
or needed care. If no decision is made, the basis on which people do not get an 
organ or care may be based more on luck than on any reasoned consideration.37  
Other examples of cheap sentiment include views about higher prices for eggs 
from women who have certain desirable attributes,38 and, more fancifully, the 
practice of some bars and clubs of giving good-looking people preferential access 
to their venues.39 Those objecting to giving preferential treatment to individuals 
based on their appearance might be people who oppose valuing appearance to 
this extent or in this context or manner. Furthermore, those objecting might not 
desire to buy or sell eggs or get into selective nightclubs—think in this regard of 
the colloquial expression “Easy for you to say!”—or might feel disvalued by the 
 
html [https://perma.cc/NX9Z-69WH]; Lauren Cassani Davis, Would You Pull the Trolley Switch? Does 
It Matter?: The Lifespan of a Thought Experiment, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/10/trolley-problem-history-psychology-morality-
driverless-cars/409732/ [https://perma.cc/W7YT-LXJY]. There is also extensive literature on the related 
subject of taboo trade-offs. See generally Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Allocating Scarce Resources: 
A Contingency Model of Distributive Justice, 28 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 491 (1992) (The 
authors found that “[u]nder scarcity, allocators were much more likely to deny aid to claimants who were 
responsible for their predicament. Need and efficiency emerged as joint predictors of allocating aid to 
claimants who were not responsible for their predicament. Politically conservative allocators withheld 
resources from those personally responsible for their needs regardless of both severity of need and 
likelihood of effective helping, even when there were sufficient resources to satisfy all claimants, whereas 
liberals tended to provide resources to all claimants.”); Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Of Ants and 
Grasshoppers: The Political Psychology of Allocating Public Assistance, in PSYCHOLOGICAL 
PERSPECTIVES IN JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 205–33 (Barbara A. Mellers & Jonathan 
Baron eds., 1993) (examining subjects’ willingness to make distributive decisions where resources are 
scarce vs. where resources are not scarce: “[L]iberals are motivated to avoid painful trade-offs between 
important values. Lives-for-money implies a much more painful trade-off than job-opportunities-for-
money.”); Linda J. Skitka & Philip E. Tetlock, Providing Public Assistance: Cognitive and Motivational 
Processes Underlying Liberal and Conservative Policy Preferences, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
1205–1223 (1993) (finding evidence “that liberals are not mindlessly egalitarian, but try to avoid socially 
awkward value trade-offs that require placing monetary values on lives.”); Philip E. Tetlock et al., Sacred 
versus Pseudo-Sacred Values: How People Cope with Taboo Trade-Offs, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 96 
(2017) (characterizing our world as one in which the sacred competes “with the demands of the real 
world” and noting that there are “risks and challenges whenever parties’ moral perceptions are 
mismatched”).  
 37. On difficulties in broaching the topic from a cost/benefit perspective, see e.g., Aaron E. Carroll, 
Forbidden Topic in Health Policy Debate: Cost Effectiveness, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/16/upshot/forbidden-topic-in-health-policy-debate-cost-
effectiveness.html [https://perma.cc/6VAH-N8ZL] (arguing for the use of “quality-adjusted life years” to 
inform decision-making in this area). 
 38. See generally Krawiec, supra note 16; Sharyn Alfonsi, Inside Egg Donation: More Money for 
Blondes?, ABC NEWS (May 11, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/egg-donation-agencies-paid-money-
favored-attributes/story?id=10614326 [https://perma.cc/TPW5-4PNZ] (reporting that egg donors may be 
paid more for their donations if they are blond, thin, tall, have a college degree, and high SAT scores; 
“One employee, Rachel, was told that her eggs were worth more because she’s a blonde. Another, Susan, 
responded to an ad for Asian donors and was told her degree from Wellesley made her eggs more 
valuable, to the tune of $25,000. That’s more than $15,000 over industry guidelines.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Guy Birchall, Are You Hot Enough to Get into this Club?, NEWS.COM.AU (Sept. 29, 
2016), http://www.news.com.au/lifestyle/beauty/face-body/are-you-hot-enough-to-get-into-this-club/ 
news-story/f5953b513fefd3409459404f9418069b [https://perma.cc/X7AE-4GNC].   
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emphasis on traits they may not have as much of as they want.40 These objectors 
may exhibit cheap sentiment.41 
A final set of examples, admittedly more attenuated, involve differential 
pricing, including surge pricing. Where is the self-interest here? First, consider 
the non-emergency cases. Based on their previous experience, people had 
counted on some level of pricing, and now must get used to a different and worse 
state of affairs (higher prices). Airline prices used to include baggage and meals; 
increasingly, they do not.42 Fares to get places were the same no matter the time 
of day; now, they may be higher at peak times.43 Those objecting to the changes 
may express annoyance at what they see as airlines’ ability to get them to pay 
more,44 and not acknowledge the market-based rationales for these changes—
why should someone not bringing luggage be charged the same for a plane trip 
as someone who is bringing luggage?45 Surge pricing during emergencies might 
be objected to on grounds that companies should not increase the prices of 
necessary items or services during emergencies. People get to avoid reproaching 
themselves for not having planned ahead. The presumably reduced supply 
resulting from prohibiting surge pricing in these cases would not be 
acknowledged.46 
 
 40. Consider in this regard KURT VONNEGUT, JR., Harrison Bergeron, in WELCOME TO THE 
MONKEY HOUSE (1968). This short story describes a society that decides to equalize all talents. A 
“Handicapper General” makes sure that nobody is better looking, stronger, or quicker than anyone else.   
 41. This point should not be carried too far: a person who could not be drafted on grounds of their 
age or bad health could have a principled and non-cheap view that the draft is a good thing.  As with so 
many other concepts, cheap sentiment is on a continuum, and the same view might be cheap sentiment, 
or not, depending on other factors.   
 42. Unbundling in the Airline Business, BEYOND COST PLUS (June 2, 2015), 
https://www.beyondcostplus.com/blog/unbundling-airline-business [https://perma.cc/TLQ6-6N2A]. 
 43. Another related example is where umbrellas are higher priced during a storm. The self-interest 
might be in not having to reproach oneself for not planning ahead. Differential pricing generally—
charging different people different prices, and unbundling of previously bundled prices—does seem to 
bother people, even though people are quite inconsistent about it. People are not bothered, for instance, 
by discounts for students or senior citizens, or extra charges for meals on important holidays. See Irwin, 
supra note 3. 
 44. Chris Matyszczyk, Want to See All the Nasty Fees Your Airline Charges? The Government Just 
Said You Can’t, INC. (Dec. 9, 2017), https://www.inc.com/chris-matyszczyk/want-to-know-all-annoying-
fees-your-airline-charges-government-just-decided-you-shouldnt.html [https://perma.cc/JNG2-43M2]. 
 45. Interestingly a few, exceedingly tentative, steps have been taken towards taking the ‘extra weight 
should mean extra costs’ rationale so far as to make people who weigh more pay more for their plane 
trips. See, e.g., Beth Blair, Should Obese Passengers Pay More to Fly?, BBC (Oct. 20, 2016), 
http://www.bbc.com/autos/story/20161020-should-obese-passengers-pay-more [https://perma.cc/M2DK-
WEZ9]; Alex Davies, How Long Until All Airlines Charge More for Fat People?, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 5, 
2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/will-big-airlines-charge-fat-passengers-extra-2013-4 [https:// 
perma.cc/WG2Y-KDAS]. 
 46. A company could decide for reputational reasons not to engage in surge pricing, especially in 
emergency situations. Home Depot has apparently rejected surge pricing in emergencies, and indeed, 
has adopted the opposite strategy: “The first thing they did was direct all prices to be frozen in areas 
likely to be affected by the storm. There is no surge pricing at Home Depot stores after a disaster, in both 
a longstanding corporate policy and a matter of law in many states. But the company doesn’t stop with 
that. All those logistics people and other staffers are there to ensure that the surge in demand after a 
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III 
TAKING CONSEQUENCES INTO ACCOUNT 
This article aims to have the consequences of cheap sentiment better taken 
into account before instantiating cheap sentiment into policy. What would that 
entail? 
It does not necessarily entail deciding in favor of market-oriented solutions 
where these may conflict with expressive law or policy. Recall the example above 
of locating a polluting factory in a country that had high poverty and low life 
expectancy.  Citizens of the country could be paid so much that they might have 
a much better life for the short time they lived, whereas their alternative would 
be to continue to live in poverty and die young. The choice would be between a 
comfortable short life and an uncomfortable, but equally short, life. Banking on 
a country’s continuing impoverished state as a rationale for a business decision 
seems repugnant. Should we second-guess a decision to not even consider 
locating the factory in the poor country on grounds that we are engaging in cheap 
sentiment? Or should strong consensus about what constitutes repugnance be 
sufficient to outweigh instrumental benefits? 
Consider the arguments about permitting versus prohibiting needle 
exchanges for illegal drugs, and for sex education and access to contraceptives for 
underage and unmarried adults. In both cases, the expressive story is given—the 
society does not want to encourage, or communicate its encouragement of, more 
drug use; the society does not want to encourage, or communicate its 
encouragement of, sex among unmarried teenagers. In both cases, there are 
serious costs of maintaining this posture. Data suggests that the net effect of 
having needle exchanges makes taking drugs less dangerous,47 and the net effect 
of less access to sex education and contraception and a focus on abstinence 
education makes teenaged pregnancy and STDs more likely.48 But, proponents 
of taking the expressive stance say, if society says these types of behaviors are 
acceptable by providing clean needles or sex education, there will be more of 
them; if society says the behaviors are unacceptable, they may decline. Who 
knows? Complicating the issue is that people have different views about the 
behaviors, such that encouraging the behaviors may seem far worse to some than 
to others. Addressing the drug/contraception context and other like contexts, the 
“harm reduction/it’s going to happen anyway” argument has much more force to 
 
disaster is matched with a higher supply of the goods people need. As hurricane season approaches, 
dedicated warehouses are stocked with goods that will be needed if a major storm hits, according to the 
company’s director of corporate communications, Stephen Holmes. And that’s why, as soon as Irma 
passed the Miami area and the major highways were confirmed to be passable, a convoy of 41 tractor-
trailers full of generators, plywood, chain saws and similar items trekked from Georgia to South Florida, 
escorted by the police.” Irwin, supra note 3.  
 47. Syringe Services Program, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Sept. 28, 2017), 
https://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/ssps.html [https://perma.cc/25YF-9XPF]. 
 48. Kathrin F. Stanger-Hall & David W. Hall, Abstinence-Only Education and Teen Pregnancy 
Rates: Why We Need Comprehensive Sex Education in the U.S., 6 PLOS ONE 1, 6 (2011). 
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people who think the behavior is not so bad and that the people who engage in it 
are sympathetic victims; it will have much less force for people who think the 
behavior is very bad and that the people who engage in it are fully responsible 
for their own bad choices. 
Taking consequences into account does not mean accepting the status quo as 
inviolate. Consider the following quote about surge pricing: 
Those who object to surge pricing, even those of us who understand it, would rather live 
in a world where people would do the moral thing—give someone a ride out of the 
danger zone, without making them pay through the nose. I know we don’t live in such 
a world, but I sure wish we did. And acknowledging that we don’t feels like admitting 
failure. Research has shown that markets don’t just force us to confront our selfishness, 
but often make it even worse.49 
Does assuming that people will do what their material self-interest requires 
make that outcome more likely? To increase the availability of organs for 
transplantation, we may conclude that some well-crafted financial inducements 
ultimately would yield the best results, but the idea that too much of a market 
focus might crowd out altruistic donation should be taken seriously. 
Compounding the complexity of the issue, even absent an expressive effect, 
we are not very good at predicting consequences. It is easy enough to predict that, 
all else equal, the prospect of making money serves as an incentive, and the 
prospect of going to prison serves as a disincentive. But all else is never equal. 
Those advocating for an increase in the minimum wage might seem to be 
engaging in cheap sentiment when they argue that “everyone” should make at 
least a living wage. It might seem that they are ignoring realities of economics—
that if something costs more, less of it will be purchased, including higher-priced 
labor. But efforts to demonstrate the effects of increasing the minimum wage 
have not yielded a definitive answer.50 People react in complex ways. In 
particular, assuming that people are principally motivated by narrow material 
self-interest, as economists have traditionally done, turns out to predict less than 
the economists had thought, or at least claimed. For instance, economics had not 
predicted that people are as altruistic as they turn out to be.51 Also contradicting 
 
 49. Sullivan, supra note 3.  
 50. See generally Claire A. Hill, An Identity Theory of the Short- and Long-Term Investor Debate, 41 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 475, 479–80 (2018) (“The ‘baggage’ of identity helps explain why evidence pointed 
to by one side will often not suffice for (or convince) the other side. Consider the debate about the 
desirability of greatly raising the minimum wage. Differing priors may include different commitments to 
theory, different views about “factual” matters, such as the availability of opportunities, and different 
values as to the obligations and privileges of citizenship.”). 
 51. See Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity—Evidence and 
Economic Applications, in 1 ADVANCES IN ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS, ECONOMETRIC 
SOCIETY MONOGRAPHS, EIGHTH WORLD CONGRESS 208, 250 (Mathias Dewatripont et al. eds., 2003) 
(“The self-interest model has been very successful in explaining individual behavior on competitive 
markets, but it is unambiguously refuted in many situations in which individuals interact strategically. 
The experimental evidence on, e.g., ultimatum games, dictator games, gift exchange games, and public 
good games, demonstrates unambiguously that many people are not only maximizing their own material 
payoffs, but that they are also concerned about social comparisons, fairness, and the desire to 
reciprocate.”). 
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some canonical economics expectations, a famous experiment found that parents 
were more apt to pick up their children late from day care when a fine was 
instituted; simple economic reasoning would have predicted less lateness, but it 
turns out that people prefer paying money to feeling guilty.52 What follows from 
this? That there is no way to distinguish in a rigorous principled way between 
cases where our best estimate of the instrumental costs of a legal prohibition or 
permission at a particular point in time ought to weigh more heavily than the 
expressive message sent by having the prohibition or permission. But that does 
not mean we should not try harder than we presently do to limit the force of 
cheap sentiment. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Cheap sentiment is a belief an individual has from which she benefits, without 
appreciating, acknowledging, or paying the associated costs. Academics write as 
though people should hold consistent beliefs, but this “should” surely has no 
force, moral or otherwise, for society generally. Significantly, cheap sentiments 
are not just individual—they are social, passing muster in the communities in 
which individuals exist and define themselves. Especially because they are social, 
they influence policymakers. Cheap sentiment or more precisely, conduct or 
positions based on cheap sentiment, can thus be condemned for its potential 
policy effects. Cheap sentiment is a common phenomenon: it arises not only in 
notoriously charged areas such as transactions involving organs, blood, or other 
bodily parts or substances, but also in further-flung areas, including some that 
might initially seem less charged, such as differential pricing. 
Policy ought to do the best it can to take consequences into account.  Of 
course, what will happen under different scenarios cannot necessarily be known 
or agreed upon. But society benefits when we try. This surely is not controversial; 
my contribution is to identify a pervasive pathology that prevents us from doing 
better on this front, one that leads to us being too quick not to consider certain 
possibilities or even ruling them out altogether without giving them due 
consideration. I hope that by characterizing the phenomenon of cheap sentiment 
as a pathology, and accommodation to it as problematic and not inevitable, my 
framing can serve as a needed counterweight. 
 
 
 52. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). See also Samuel 
Bowles, Policies Designed for Self-Interested Citizens May Undermine “The Moral Sentiments”: Evidence 
from Economic Experiments, 320 SCIENCE 1605 (2008) (“[I]ncentives that appeal to self-interest may fail 
when they undermine the moral values that lead people to act altruistically or in other public-spirited 
ways.”). 
